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Introduction  
Ken Westphal is to be commended for his accomplished explanation of what we can safely 
assume is essentially encompassed by the broad sweep of political, legal and moral thought 
that  now  identifies itself as Normative Constructivism. Two things put us on the right path in 
this regard. One is Westphal’s positive decision to make sensible and compelling suggestions 
to look for rapprochement and synthesis between, on the one hand, the resignation to 
noumenal limitations in Kant’s transcendentalism and, on the other, Hegel’s passion to 
overcome the alienation of thought and object ethically and scientifically. The other, either by 
careful design or diplomatic omission, is by promoting a more expansive notion of 
constructivism that avoids the unhelpful diversion of pitting the officially subscribed ‘social 
contract’ theorists (Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant), to those who unconvincingly opposed it 
(Hume)1 and those who articulated important objections to it (Hegel).2 Thus we arrive at a 
                                               
1 David Hume, “Of the Original  Contract” Moral and Political Essays  [1748] reproduced in  
Social Contract: Essays by Locke Hume Rousseau (Sir Ernest Barker [ Ed] Oxford  University 
Press, Oxford, 1960) pp. 147-166. This undoubtedly important essay from Hume offers some 
invaluable insights into the collective wisdom of populations who have reconstituted themselves 
after war and usurpation throughout the entirety of history. Whilst it successfully refutes the idea of 
an actual original contract of government in any society, it simply supports, in my view, the central 
arguments of Hobbes vision of Leviathan. There is no doubt of course that any notion of a 
constitutionally legitimating social contract is a rational reconstruction to be imputed not 
discovered historically. 
 
2 See: T.M.Knox [ Trans]   Hegel’s Philosophy of Right  (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1967 ) 
First Part: ‘Contract’ §75 pp. 58,59.  Here, Hegel, in describing Kant’s subsumption of the concept 
of marriage and the concept of contract says, 
 
 It is equally far from the truth to ground the nature of the state in the contractual 
relation, whether the state is supposed to be a contract of all with all, or of all with 
the monarch and the government. 
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point where we might survey the anatomy of normative constructivism with some critical 
confidence.  
The first thing we can say about this long-standing school of constitutional constructivism 
that stretches from Hobbes through the work of the notables mentioned above, particularly to 
to Rawls3 and Habermas4  and between and beyond,5 is that these authors, wary of the 
determinate application of Natural Law, agnostic toward the idea of Objective Right or 
positively antithetical to it, seek to combine ‘significant’ elements of a philosophical 
anthropology with a theory of social order in the attempt to synthesise normative justifications 
for authoritative institutions. Although this general methodological aspiration is a necessary 
attribute for inclusion within the paradigm of Normative Constructivism (in the sense that we 
are accustomed to receive it contemporarily), it is not a sufficient account of the strategy. 
Presenting legitimacy as the upshot of an equation which in some way combines a 
philosophical anthropology with a model of social order has not been the exclusive preserve 
of the authors of liberal modernity.  Plato’s Republic and Aquinas’s interpretations of 
                                                                                                                                                            
 The intrusion of this contractual relation, and relationships concerning private 
property generally, into the relation between the individual and the state has been 
productive of the greatest confusion in both constitutional law and public life. 
 
Hegel goes on, importantly: 
 
… in ...[R]ecent times the rights of the monarch and the state have been regarded as 
the subjects of a contract and as grounded in contract, something embodying merely a 
common will and resulting from the arbitrariness of parties united into a state. 
[emphasis added]. 
 
3 See,  e.g.,  Rawls, John, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory”  The Journal of Philosophy  
Vol. 77, No.9,1980  pp. 515-572 
 
4 See, generally, Habermas, Jurgen, The Theory  of Communicative  Action Vol.1 (Heinemann, 
London 1981    
 
5 Notably in Ronald Dworkin’s conception of ‘Law as Integrity’ in Law’s Empire  (Harvard 
University Press ,1987).  
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Aristotle6 are but two examples of, respectively, ancient and mediaeval attempts to 
manipulate the equation in question. It is worthwhile noting at this point that constitutionally 
neither of these influential contributions to the philosophy of the state and social order depend 
upon, or advocate, the equality of right or the centrality of the individual. The kind of 
Constructivism we see evolving from Hobbes to Hegel, however, rests eventually upon an 
equation which was produced by a Copernican revolution in moral and political thought. In 
what becomes literally an inversion of the mediaeval conception of the state and the 
individual, we see the replacement of a theocratic model of institutional stasis, fixed hierarchy 
and the legitimating axioms of Aquinian ‘revealed ends’7 by the pivotal primacy of subjective 
right over objective notions of The Good. Thus the philosophical anthropology that attends 
this revolution consists in a model of the individual infused with what Alan Brudner calls, 
‘the liberal confidence’: This is a set of presuppositions about the ‘final worth’ or end-status 
of the individual from which, eventually, and in the context of association and the exigencies 
of our physical finitude, constitutional norms are to be extrapolated. Brudner describes the 
claims of the ‘liberal confidence’ as consisting of the following propositions:8 
[ ... ] that the individual agent possesses final worth (which I shall sometimes call 
end-status) so that there is no more fundamental end to which it may be unilaterally 
subordinated; that it does so on its own, that is, as a separate individual, distinct from 
(that is, not immersed in or obliterated by or subsumed under) other individuals as 
well as from the larger groups, society, or political association of which it is a 
member; and that and that the individual’s worth is inviolable, which means that 
everyone is under a duty to respect it by forbearing from attempts to subdue the 
individual’s  agency to his own ends or to some supposed superior end such as tribe, 
nation, society or state. This set of propositions constitutes what I shall call the 
liberal confidence.  
 
                                               
6 See Plato The Republic [Benjamin Jowett  Trans. 1871]. See also Thomas Aquinas Commentary 
on Aristotle's Politics.  In Aquinas: Political Writings. (Trans. R.W. Dyson. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 2002) 
 
7  On the transition from mediaeval to  modern constitutional principles see  Alan Brudner  
Constitutional Goods (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004) pp.52,53 
 
8 Alan Brudner  Constitutional Goods (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004) p.13 
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There is scope for disagreement about the amount of enthusiasm which the classical 
constructivists in question can be said to display for this manifesto: for example, Hobbes is a 
great Liberal thinker, although often portrayed as authoritarian in outlook. But, even in what 
are sometimes assumed to be Hobbes’s most security-conscious moments, we discern the 
thesis that the raison d’être of constructing principles of social order is not to preserve 
hierarchy per se, or to preserve life per se, but to make possible  the individual’s potential for 
pursuit of   the Goods of civilised associational life.9 The individual pursuit of the Good is, of 
course, the central theme in the writings of the most influential 20th and 21st century liberal 
theorists even though the most influential emphasis has focussed on the 'lexical priority' of 
Right over objective assumptions about the value of ends in order to elevate the subjective 
prerogative of the individual as the   'author' of his or her particular and personal  conception 
of the good. Predictably, in the comparatively recent history of the literature this most un-
dialectical concentration on the unique isolation of the individual produced an equally 
unbalanced reaction in liberalism's defence of 'community'.  Espousing 'the liberal confidence'  
requires  a coherent commitment to what is implied by acknowledging the ultimate worth of 
the individual not simply  in terms of liberty, nor even liberty and equality, but holistically in 
liberty , equality and community.  Un-dialectical or perhaps ‘un-dialogical’ emphasis on one 
or another aspect of the concept of liberal right unleashes a destructive potential on the other 
dimensions of freedom. A failure to fashion a coherent synthesis in this regard produces the 
attritional pathology of ‘atomism’, and we can say right from the outset that Westphal  is right 
to mark out Hegel’s Constructivism  as the approach that is most alert to  this destructive 
tendency in the  philosophy of liberalism. This tendency is most comprehensively analysed in 
Alan Brudner’s Constituional Goods (2004) where, in support of a non-transcendental 
                                               
9 Hobbes etc 
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methodology   based on (Hegel’s) notion of mutual recognition, he says of prevailing 
liberalism:10 
[...] there are constitutional rights but no constitutional goods. That is, there are no 
human goods qualified to override fundamental rights and so none fit in that sense 
for constitutional status. A fundamental right, on this theory, can be limited only by 
another fundamental right so as to achieve the point of both, or by laws ensuring 
equality in the exercise of right. Furthermore, there is, for the prevailing theory, no 
ideal of human personality (as specified by a determinate scheme of fundamental 
ends) whose fostering and promotion by the public authority individuals have a right 
to demand and that would on that account qualify for constitutional status. 
 
 Methodologically, then, embracing a coherent version ‘the liberal confidence’ demands a 
flawless integrity in the approach to constructing a theory of institutions. This is to be 
expected, because a commitment to the individual’s final worth is the greater part of a 
philosophical anthropology itself, and it should be obvious that this profound claim about the 
human condition must determine in large part the other side of the constructivist equation, 
namely, the institutional structure that serves as a model of legitimate social order consistent 
with that final worth.  
 
Westphal’s analysis of the power of Constructivism in general is plausible and often 
compelling, and so, as noted, is his argument that Hegel presents us with a superior  synthesis 
of the strivings of  individual freedom within the sphere of  cultural, ethical and legal 
authority.  Thus I do not wish to take issue with these general conclusions per se but I am of 
the view that there is a straighter and narrower (if less comfortable and, for some, less 
palatable ) path to the destination Westphal has in view. And with this in mind I intend to 
engage briefly and selectively with a couple of the strategies of  argumentation deployed.  I 
intend to touch upon some implications of the (normative) objectivist/ subjectivist distinctions 
drawn in  Euthyphro and of Westphal’s  suggestion that it is possible to assimilate Hume’s 
                                               
10 Alan Brudner  Constitutional Goods (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004) p.21 
. 
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methodological views in overcoming moral realism in general by ‘artificial means’ in this 
regard, and in Hegelian terms in particular.  These  issues are to a large extent subsumed 
methodologically by  what I have tried to suggest is a powerful and problematic dialectic of 
implications between, on the one hand, the concept of final worth, and on the other, the 
conception of social order. Whilst this dialectic might not be fatal to a conceptually agile and  
‘pragmatic’ approach to developing a Constructivist project of synthesising justificatory 
grounds for constitutional norms, it might prove to be a challenge to the sensibilities of 
‘strong’ Constructivists perturbed by too close an encounter with what Westphal  refers to as 
“real’, mind- independent moral facts’. The first indication of an aversion to such facts occurs 
in Westphal’s resistance to an objectivist interpretation of the unrequited exchange in 
Euthyphro. Let us briefly refresh our recollections of this famous conversation. 
 
Euthyphro 
 The meeting  between Socrates and Euthyphro  takes place in urgent circumstances with very 
little time available to the two protagonists to converse. Socrates, as defendant, and 
Euthyphro, as plaintiff, meet in the porch outside the court of Archon awaiting to be  
summoned to participate in their respective trial proceedings. Piety is no casual topic for 
either protagonist: Socrates stands charged by Meletus with Impiety, namely, by inventing 
new Gods through poetry and denying the existence of the old Gods through sophistry; 
Euthyphro, appears to lay a charge against his father - believing himself duty-bound to the 
follow the pious example of Zeus in prosecuting his own father for the same transgression.  
Socrates is alarmed to hear of Euthyphro’s dramatic intentions, and even more alarmed when 
Euthyphro  tells him that his own family have accused him of acting impiously himself for so 
doing. Euthyphro says: “That shows, Socrates, how little they know of the opinions of the 
Gods about piety and impiety ... “ Eventually and predictably, Socrates enquires, ”And what 
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is piety, and what is impiety?”. It is Euthyphro’s seemingly reasonable response to this 
question that produces one of philosophy’s most famous rejoinders.   Euthyphro  announces 
confidently that he is beyond criticism for his actions because he is merely following in the 
footsteps of Zeus whom men regard  “... as the best and most righteous of the Gods”. 
Euthyphro goes on to point out that it  was  Zeus who bound his father, Cronos, for devouring 
his sons and that moreover, Cronos too behaved similarly in respect of his father, Uranus. 
Euthyphro thus concludes: 
And yet when I proceed against my father, they [Euthyphro’s  family] are angry with 
me. This is their inconsistent way of talking when the gods are concerned, and when 
I am concerned.” [emphasis added] 
 
From this point the logical fate of Euthyphro's  misplaced confidence in Zeus as a reliable 
paragon is well known.  It comes about in two pivotal   stages for the purposes of the 
discussion in hand (although there is protracted argument in the actual dialogue). The first is 
the failure to grasp on the one hand, the relationship between contingent actions assumed to 
be instances of piety and, on the other , the ground of general maxims of piety. The second, 
and most important, arises when Euthyphro accepts that constant warring and disagreement 
amongst the Gods makes it difficult for us to look to them as consistent paragons of pious 
behaviour, but, at Socrates suggestion, accepts what we might refer to as the ‘consensualist’  
amendment  that, “ what all the gods love is pious, what all the gods hate is impious”. To this 
Socrates invites Eutyhyphro to consider whether piety is loved  by the Gods because it is 
holy, or whether it is holy  because it is loved  by the gods. This logic of the inquiry is to mark 
the  distinction between on the one hand  a contingent ‘accident’ or attribute –of piety (i.e., 
the condition of being beloved of the Gods), and on the other, the ‘essence’ or necessarily 
inherent characteristic of piety (i.e., a possible reason that might explain why it  is beloved by 
the Gods). This is straightforwardly relevant to our concerns and so let  us for a moment move 
unceremoniously from the revered dialogue to a more convenient idiom. 
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The Euthyphro is left famously incomplete and no conclusions on these issues are definitively 
advanced. But, as is often the case, understanding the questions can be more important than 
being presented with the answers.  In contemplating the import of this notorious question  
Westphal sees what he takes to be an unnecessary opposition between objectivist and 
subjectivist accounts of moral normativity arising from Socrates’ dissatisfaction with 
Euthyphro’s  ‘consensualist’  amendment.  We are being forced to take sides on  whether 
there is  a fundamental, objective  reality underpinning the various instances of what we 
perceive as the Good, or whether judgements of  what is to be regarded as Good are  merely  
the product of a pluralistic,  personal (subjective) attitudes.  Westphal   suggests that even if 
the latter position is true we need not despair of constructing an objectively defensible theory 
of normativity for the political sciences.  
He says:11 
If moral distinctions depend upon attitudes ... then this augers conventionalism, 
relativism or scepticism ... [H]owever, such conclusions follow only with an 
additional premise I shall call the 'Arbitrariness Thesis' 
 
This thesis maintains that:12  
If moral standards are altogether artificial, then they are also relative, conventional or 
arbitrary and so are not objectively valid. 
 
This latter, says Westphal, is false, and its rejection provides the key to Hume's Theory of 
Justice' , He quotes Hume thus: 
Though the rules of justice be artificial, they are not arbitrary. Nor is the expression 
improper to call them Laws of Nature; if by natural we understand what is common 
to any species, or even if we confine it to mean what is inseparable from the species. 
(Treatise 3.2.1.19)   
 
Let us briefly the rhetoric and argument of the dialogue and then retur to Hume.    
                                               
11 Ken Westphal  “Hegel, Natural Law and Moral Constructivism” The Owl of Minerva (Vol pp.)  
 
12 Ibid. 
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To act piously, we can say, is to act morally; in other words it is to strive do our moral duty. 
Some interesting questions arise at this point: acting dutifully in this sense requires that we 
are aware of our obligations – to the state, to our families, to our friends and to the wider 
community. We can speak about acting morally, piously, justly, ethically and this variety of  
terms no doubt  help us mark some interesting distinctions, but  in general we can say that the 
morally dutiful person does not seek simply to satisfy his or her own interests and appetites, 
but must take into account the interests of others when he or she acts. Just who these others 
might be, and what interests in particular should concern us give us a hint of the complexity 
of the question.  But if we aspire be good and to do good, we must ask ourselves the  
condensed version 'of this question: What is The Good?' This is the question on which the 
would-be 'pious' of the dialogue, or those interested in the nature of 'normative critique' 
should reflect. To learn how to do good we can observe and replicate the behaviour of others 
(like Zeus) who are assumed to be morally accomplished persons. But this is a mechanical 
exercise of mimicry and without understanding the essential principles of morality we can 
only hope that our circumstances mirror those of our paragons. The critical deficit here is 
obvious – we are condemned to practise virtue by rote, not, as Kant and Hegel might suggest,  
to give autonomous and reflective expression to our own moral freedom. The contingent 
circumstances in which a pious (moral or ethical) person is adjudged to act dutifully 
presupposes knowledge of principles  underpinning  general maxims which provide the  
critical purchase on these normative matters. 
 
What the Euthyphro seeks to express is that in a community where our most revered paragons 
of normativity disagree continually and violently about what is right and wrong, permissible 
and impermissible, worthy and unworthy, we can learn nothing of the nature of such 
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principles. Optimistically we might say that these squabbles among the paragons are in 
themselves irrelevant: on the profound subject of virtue and moral duty we will find 
consensus among them. But in examining this consensus (and this tack is reminiscent of 
Hume as we might presently note)13 might we discern the essence of piety? Just as with 
Socrates’ objection to Euthyphro’s observing and replicating the  single instance of Zeus’s 
punishment of his father, we do not glean self- evidently the general underlying maxim  of the 
action. Similarly, we  might list all the objects of divine consensus and remain equally 
undedified.  This is a returns us to square one. The traditionalist might suggest, optimistically, 
that with a larger sample of persons in agreement  we might at  least be on firmer ground with 
a larger reference group to emulate in our moral strivings. But the philosopher would say 
what Plato has Socrates  say to Euthyphro: that we are no nearer to gleaning the essence of 
piety (or The Good, or the basis of Moral Right) because in our complacency about the moral 
authenticity of the  paragons we choose – or are instructed – to  revere, and of the power of 
consensus among them, we do not know (or perhaps have not  even thought about) whether 
The Good is beloved of  the paragons  because it is good, or whether it is good because it is 
beloved of the paragons. 
The inquiry in the dialogue, as noted, is unrequited. Euthyphro's intellectual performance is 
less than scintillating, and irritatingly, Socrates is content to appear humble and puzzled by 
the issues at hand. It seems that there is little prospect of metaphysical enlightenment for the 
reader. But we know enough about Plato's Idealism and the Theory of Forms to be certain that 
the relativist (pluralist or subjectivist) option seemingly on offer in the defining question put 
to Euthyphro is purely rhetorical, and that we should interpret the dialogue as an attempt to 
                                               
13 Hume does offer some thoughts on how we might approach scientific analysis of morality, 
but these are based on the thesis that linguistic references to  the good and the moral are to be 
found among all races the nations, and that –significantly -some common element underpins 
this ubiquity of linguistic usage.  
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hammer home the point that, in relation to the aspiration to piety or, we might say, to moral 
duty, action-guiding knowledge demands a general principle. 
Moreover, given the determined line of questioning Socrates imposes on his hapless 
acquaintance, we have a pretty good idea what the essence of piety – the perfect form of The 
Good in relation to moral duty – would look like. In Enlightenment terminology it takes the 
form of a supreme moral principle – an imperative – and a necessarily categorical one; for it 
must arise from metaphysical knowledge of ends that are truly good in themselves. It is odd, 
therefore, that Westphal   employs this particular dialogue in proposing a systematic approach 
to normative constructivism. For it demands that we give literal credence to the rhetoric of 
moral subjectivism as somehow  providing the methodological insight that sets us on the right 
path towards an understanding of Constructivist analysis in social and political philosophy. 
 
Hume 
Might it not be wiser to  draw the conclusion that Socrates' inquiries to Euthyphro should 
provoke us to think harder about locating a criterion for the Good (or the pious) rather than 
precipitously abandoning moral objectivity or moral realism and sprinting, theoretically, in 
the direction of what looks to be a fruitful constructivism. Because we should remember that 
replacing the words ‘artificial’ or ‘conventional’, with ‘constructive’ does very little 
philosophical work. In this regard we might also note that  following up the lesson of 
Euthyphro with Hume’s optimism about turning ‘artificial’ rules into ‘natural laws’ or ‘laws 
of nature’ is might prove to be problematic; not least  because Hume’s views about objective 
moral truths are straightforwardly (and, in the history of philosophy, famously and 
definitively) non-cognitivist.  
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Hume’s non-cognitivism is not inspired by Socrates’ irrepressible interrogation of 
Euthyphro’s superstitious confidence in the infallibility of an unlikely hypothetical consensus 
among warring, vindictive and jealous gods, but by a superbly focused continuation of 
Bacon’s critique of the problem of induction and the logic of observation. As proponents of 
Constructivism, although anxious about the ontological commitments required by moral 
realism and keen to make the best of convention and artifice, we surely would not want to 
now end up in the same position as Hume in the Treatise  notwithstanding Euthyphro.  Hume 
is not ‘neutral’ or ‘agnostic’ about objective moral realism, he is decidedly sceptical. It is 
Hume who is responsible for a much more onerous  distinction than moral realism/non-
realism, namely, the fact-value distinction (Hume’s Fork) which underpins the Hume’s 
famous ‘Law’ laying down the prohibition on purporting to derive a morally  normatively 
‘ought’   from an empirically grounded ’is’.  
It is worth noting that Hume’s critique of a science of values has by far outperformed its 
fragile foundations. Hume tells us that reason deals with a twofold division: relations of ideas 
and the relations between matters of fact and existence. Fact and existence are what we are 
able to observe to be contingently the case by use of our physical senses, whereas relations of 
ideas - or conceptual relations - present themselves to our understanding in terms of necessity 
or contradiction. This in itself is reasonable and plausible, and on the face of it there is no 
reason why we should exercise ourselves in mounting a challenge to it. However, we are 
being asked to accept that only propositions concerning matters of fact and existence convey 
any meaningful and genuinely informative knowledge, whereas the realm of the a priori – 
however complex its appearance – is reduced simply to empty tautology. This doctrine, of 
course, was exhumed 200 years after Hume by the logical positivists and resulted in some of 
the most extreme and nihilistic conceptions of moral reasoning yet to be produced. 14 There is 
                                               
14 See Stuart Toddington “ Dialectical Necessity and the Is-Ought Problem” in Gewirthian 
Perspectives on Human Rights  – (Per Bauhn[ Ed.],  Routledge, London, 2016)  pp.63-78 
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scope for detailed debate in these matters, but suffice it to say that even if the ‘fact-value 
distinction’ alluded to in Hume’s Fork might be ‘Constructively’ re-stated,15 the problem of 
producing genuinely justifiable normative propositions from empirically descriptive 
observations appears to be insurmountable.16 So in moving from Plato to the rejection of 'the 
thesis of arbitrariness', and on to Hume’s optimism about naturalising the artificial, we are 
making little  progress in laying down a non-arbitrary basis for Constructivism.  
 
Constructivism and Moral Relevance  
Westphal is aware of this looming impasse because he suggests that we might take 
constructivist steps respectively to (1), find, (2), identify and sort  basic and significant 
elements,  within a ‘domain of enquiry’ (and here of course we must refer to a domain of 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
15 Ibid.p.74 . On the matter of the  sceptical or relativist ‘Fork’  and quoting Hume inter alia, I 
noted: 
 
In  the Enquiries of 1748, moral reasoning is not only juxtaposed to ‘matters of fact 
and existence’, in that we are to accept that  “All reasonings may be divided into two 
kinds, namely, demonstrative reasoning, or that concerning relations of ideas and 
moral reasoning, or that concerning matters of fact and existence.”,  but we are also 
told [by Hume] that there is merely a difference in degree between mathematical and 
moral concepts.  In the Philosophy of Morals of 1751, however, Hume announces, 
“Men are now cured of their passion for hypotheses and systems… and will hearken 
to no arguments but those which are derived from experience.”.  Men will, of course, 
still  endeavour  to “ [... ] find those universal principles from which all censure  or 
approbation is ultimately derived   ... but this is a question of fact, not of abstract 
science.”.  We have, then the ‘Fork’,  but are now unsure upon which prong to 
skewer moral concepts. 
 
16 Ibid. See esp pp.68,69. The best attempt to overcome it of which I am aware is in Gewirth’s 
Reason and Morality (Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1978 ) but this claims to derive a ‘moral 
ought’  not from an empirical ‘is’, but from  a ‘dialectically necessary’  ought of practical reason.   
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constitutional morality) (3)‘construct adequate principles or adequate theory’ for that domain’ 
by (4) using ‘preferred’ principles of construction.17  
 
Because (ex hypothesi the domain in question) these ‘basic and significant elements must turn 
out to be ‘subjective’, we still face ‘fundamental’ problems because: 
[…] historically and geographically (regionally, culturally) these various kinds of 
subjective basic elements vary significantly. Consequently they are undermined by 
the Pyrronhian  18dilemma19  of the criterion (Westphal 2014 a 2016 ) 
We are thus “in dire need of”:20 
[… ] sufficiently robust moral principles to avoid or surmount those kinds of 
differences, which have their equally problematic counterparts if instead we try to 
base our moral principles or theory on claims about real mind independent moral 
facts. 
 
How might we break the bonds of this compounding impasse? Westphal says, 
The required objectivity can be identified and  justified by a moral constructivism 
based instead upon objective basic elements (Step 1), namely: objective facts 
concerning our very finite species of embodied semi-rational agency, together with 
basic, pervasive features of our context of action, namely the globe we inhabit. The 
relevant facts concern basic human capacity to act so as to affect anything, together 
with our various all too human susceptibilities, e.g., the error, injury, deception, 
extortion or seduction. 
 
One must agree at least with this list of ingredients for any possible notion - Constructivist or 
otherwise - of a political and ethical philosophy of human association and institutional norms. 
Immediately following this enumeration of the basic elements  Westphal notes, importantly: 
 
These are features of our conditio humane; they are morally relevant facts, but are 
not themselves moral facts.21 
                                               
17 Westphall  Ibid. 
 
18 Ibid. 
 
19 
20 Westphal 
 
21Westpahal 
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We can thus rapidly build and refine a model of constructivism from here. But we can also 
rapidly run into problems that might lead us to scrutinise more carefully the quote 
immediately above in which we are introduced to the important distinction between ‘the 
morally relevant’ and the ‘morally factual’.. The methodological direction that suggests itself 
from this point is.one of mapping out the problems of social coordination that arise from the 
model of the human condition described above. Westphal recalls  Hobbes’s insights in this 
regard concerning unlimited freedom of human action: where there is uncertainty about what 
belongs to whom we can expect a system of inevitable mutual interference that undermines 
the possibility of effective action by anyone, especially where there is a need to coordinate the 
use of material resources including air, space, water and foodstuffs.22 Hobbes, Hume and 
Rousseau, says Westphal,  
“[ ...] all recognise these problems of coordination as moral problems  which can 
only be solved by public mutually recognised principles of action, together with their 
institutionalisation as social practices.”  
 
‘Morality’, ‘moral relevance’ and ‘moral facts’  will require some careful scrutiny from here 
on in, but in the sense in which morality refers to ‘other-regarding’ duties it makes sense to 
understand the institutionalization of social coordination practices as requiring regular and 
repeated forbearance on the part of individuals in respect of their relations with others. Where 
this forbearance is made obligatory, these co-ordinatory  principles and practices begin to 
constitute what we can understand as the basis of law and civil society. Westphal reminds us 
that Rousseau’s addition to Hobbes and Hume’s basic observations articulate the fundamental 
ethical constitutional issue:23 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
22Westphal 
 
23 Here Westphal quotes Rousseau in the CS 4.8.30 1964 
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[ ...]  these fundamental social principles and practices can only be justified is 
legitimate, if and insofar as they provide for or secure  the independence of each and 
all by ensuring that no one can attain or wield  the kind of extent of power or wealth 
by which s/he can unilaterally command the  decision and action of anyone else. 
 
This outline of constructivist methodology and of the basic problems of constitutional 
legitimacy is uncontentious. Our introductory remarks concerning the normative issues 
implicated in producing an equation which combined a model of human nature (a 
philosophical anthropology) with a model of social order do however, come more sharply into 
critical focus. With this brief nod to egalitarianism we introduce, among other things, rights to 
security, freedom of decision and action, notions of power, and the recognition that the 
accumulation of property affects the security of freedom of action. In light of this, we must be 
more cautious about assuming that we can uncontentiously  separate what is ‘morally relevant' 
to what now must be claimed to be ‘morally factual’. 
 
Constructivism and Moral Facts  
The reason why we should stand firm in response to the notorious question posed in Euthypro  
is that we are likely to produce obfuscation if we suggest that it is possible to establish 
constitutional foundations on the moral pluralism and subjectivism that flows from what we 
might call the 'consensualist' option.  The scope for confusion in talking imprecisely about 
what is morally relevant and what is morally factual is considerable.  
To avoid it we should begin by acknowledging that the account of  normative constructivism 
Westphal plausibly perceives as having  evolved  from Hobbes to Hegel is a liberal normative 
constructivism, and rests upon an explicit commitment to the egalitarianism model of the final 
worth of the individual. This model, which, following Brudner, we referedr to as a statement 
of the 'liberal confidence', is a collection of straightforwardly metaphysical and moral claims 
about the intrinsic worth of the individual and the reciprocal rights and duties which accrue  to 
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the individual in respect of this intrinsic worth. Epistemologically it forms the core of our 
understanding of a rational and legitimate social order fit for free beings.  To subscribe to it 
philosophically is to claim with justification that it expresses our most foundational 
understanding of  what is necessarily true about the moral nature of the individual and hence 
about what ought to be true of individuals in association. In   other words this is what is to be 
understood as moral fact.   In this sense what is morally factual is easily and distinctly 
separable from what is contingently, yet crucially, relevant in moral terms about the condition 
of our existence as vulnerable, empirical beings dependent upon not only access to natural 
resources but also considerable amounts of  social cooperation. And whilst the organisation of 
these  exigencies might take many forms, and whilst these many forms or folkways might be 
normatively routinized into more or less effective and functional  forms of social order, surely 
the aspiration of Normative Constructivism must seek to introduce the specificity of the moral 
facts of the  'liberal confidence' into the critical institutional design of social order. In 
Hegelian terms this achievement would be regarded as the historical emergence of the 
Objectification of Spirit. My point is that I cannot understand this as an artificial intrusion into 
economic and social relations, but rather as the morally rational announcing itself as the 
historically  real.   
   
 
 
 
